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ABSTRACT
We discuss the monetary institutionsand macroeconomics of centrally
planned economies (CPEs); objectives andtechniques of monetary control;
the relevance to CPEs of theneutrality property, the natural rate hypothesis,
and the quantity theory; the rolesof stock .and flow variables and the
stability of asset demand and expenditurefunctions; the relation between
monetary policy, fiscal policy and incomespolicy in CPEs; the CPE equi-
valent of a floating exchange rate andits implications for monetarypolicy;
and "super crowding out."Many considerations suggest that monetarism
as theory and policy might be more applicableunder central planning than
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The essential characteristic ofcentral planning, or of acentrally planned
economy (CPE), is the detailed allocationby a centralised hierarchy ofgoods
and services among producing anddistributing organisations. This entailsthat
the allocating bureaucracy alsoissues binding targets (plans) toeach separate
organisation for its production of individualoutputs and use of the inputs
needed to make them. Bycontrast, in a market economy these decisionsare taken
in a decentralised
way, at least partly in response to signals
of demands, sup-
plies and prices communicated between
independent agents.
The economic institutions of
central planning are unfamiliar tomany in
the West, but we all havemore or less immediate experience withmonetarism.
To say that it shall be knownby its works might be too harsh, butlengthy def i—
nition is unnecessary.
Indeed, any attempt at precisecharacterization would have
to be lengthy. The controversies over
monetarist theory and policy have
been so extensive and itscurrent influence so ubiquitous thatnumerous variants
have been specified. There isno single monetarist model, however.We may
therefore take ntonetarjsm asa general body of thoughtstressing the pervasive
importance of the aggregate stock ofmoney in macroeconmjc relationships,
especially those determining quantities denominatedin money terms, such as
*Iam grateful to Jol-ni Burkett, John
Muellbauer, Ron Smith and Dennis Snower for comments, to Stan Rudcenko andDavid Winter formany discussions in the course of our joint work, and to the SSRC(U.K.) for support under itsProgramme for Quantitative and Comparative
Macroeconomics at Birkbeck. The finalversion of this paper was completedat the 1981 NBER Summer Institute.—2—
*
moneyincome.
I have no intention whatsoever to either central planning or mone—
tarism in its potential or actual application
to Britain, the United States,
or anywhere else, either as theory or aspolicy. Nor is the title meant to
tar monetarism with the brush ofassociation with central planning, orindeed
the converse. By "fellow traveller" Iunderstand one who does not explicitly
adopt a given doctrine nor even openlyidentify with it, but who acts as those
who do. Here the metaphor suggests common
analytical premises, methods and con-
clusions, albeit usually applied to verydifferent environments.
The title's query, then, is: Along whatroad might central planners and
monetarists travel together, and how far?Are monetarist principles applicable
under central planning? Are there similaritiesbetween the macroeconomics of
central planners and that of market economymonetarists, between their attitudes
and intellectual predispositions?
A final disclaimer: when discussingthe macroeconomics or monetary econo-
mics of central planning, I am not in generalreferring to Marxist monetary
theory, whether applied to a CPE oramarket economy. I am certainly not ask-
ing whether Marx's monetary theory
is monetarist, although this too is by no
means an absurd question.
Until quite recently, there was verylittle macroeconomics for CPEs, and
virtually all of this centered on the suppiyside (aggregate production func—
**
tions),ignoring aggregate demand and its components. A striking example is
the best—known theory of investment "cycles"in CPEs, in which these fluctuations
*
Mayer(1978) and Purvis (1980) are excellent generalreferences.
**
Notableexceptions are Robert Campbell (1970),Frank Holzman (1968), and
Peter Wiles (1969, 1977). My colleague,
Carol Nussey, had also embarked on such
work before her untimely death.—3—
are entirely determined by supply—side forces(Goldmann, 1964).
Resistance to a theoretical and appliedmacroeconomics of CPEs arises from
several distinct arguments, none of which Ifind convincing. First is the
belief that if all quantities areplanned and determined at the disaggregated,
microeconomic level, macroeconomicssimply cannot matter. But the planners
themselves do not accept this, andthey rightly carry out macroeconomic and
financial planning, because at leastsome macroeconomic aggregates, like house-
holds' money balances, do playa role which cannot be planned centrally at the
micro level.
A second reason for ignoringmacroeconomics, or at least monetary economics,
in CPEs is the widespread, long—standingbelief that demand always exceedssup—
ply under central planning, so supply must determineeverything. For the house-
hold sector, I have challenged the factualpremise on a wide variety of empiri-
cal grounds (1974, 1977) and, with DavidWinter, on econometric evidence (1980).
Those who start from this assumption oftenfind it hard to implementconsistently
(Green and Higgins, 1977, reviewed inPortes, 1979a).
It has also been contended that it isstrictly impossible to deal with
macroeconomic aggregates in CPEs, because relativeprices are so distorted, and
in practice the aggregates aremeaningless, because any total of expenditures
will include many items boughtonly because the buyers could not find whatthey
reallywanted. Such "forced substitution" isa consequence of both excess
aggregate demand and distorted relative prices (Kornai,1981).Wefind, how-
ever, thatthere will still be a naturalcorrespondence between what is happen-
ing at the microeconomic level and what is measuredby macroeconomic aggregates
(Portes and Winter, 1980). Aggregationover quantity—constrained micro markets,
some in excess demand and others in excesssupply, can yield smooth behaviour
and well—defined macro variables(Nuellbauer, 1978).—4—
Finally, there is a general scepticismabout theoretical and econometric
modelling of CPEs, applied most forcefully
to macroeconomics. Thus a leading
expert on Soviet money and banking says,"Standard Western analytical models
for testing monetary aspects of economic processes
are not applicable to Soviet
reality" (Garvy, 1977, p. 8). lie believesthat the data are inadequate and
that we cannot properly specify therules of economic behaviour in CPEs.I
reject both propositions. The analysis
below presupposes that CPE households,
enterprises and planners do exhibitstable behaviour which we can model, and
that macroeconomic data in these economies areadequate to describe events
both to the planners and to us as observers.Our empirical work fully justi-
fies this maintained hypothesis.*
A brief description of CPE macroeconomicinstitutions is necessary. This
refers to the "standard system", as it has appliedfor many years in the USSR
and the Six of Eastern Europe, ignoringeconomic "reforms" which have in any
case made little change, except in Hungary.
The main difference from our own macroeconomicstructure is that theirs is
much simpler. We have a diverse and complexset of financial institutions,
from the central bank to a range of separatecommercial deposit banks, building
societies, investment banks, and so forth,all performing different roles in
the process of financial intermediationbetween lenders and borrowers, savers
and investors. The CPE has a single,combined central and commercial bank with
many branches. Thismonobank facilitates central control over enterprisesand
monitoring of households' financialbehaviour. It also enforces a separation
of the types of money used by these twosectors: transactions between enter—
*Itdoes not, however, justify the use forforecasting or policy analysis
of any of the existing large—scale
macroecofloliletric models of CPEs. Before one
will be able to take that activity seriously,much more work on small structural
models and hypothesis testing will be necessary
(e.g., Burkett, Portes and Win-
ter, 1981).—5—
prises are conducted entirely with
deposit money, i.e., entries on themonobank's
books; while those between
enterprises and households, and within thehousehold
sector, are conducted with cash. Household
financial assets are cash andsav-
ings deposits.
In the state productive
sector, therefore, where resources are allocated
centrally in physical terms,money is "passive". Although there is indeedgener-
alized excess monetary demandhere (resulting fromexcess real demand, or "over—
full employment planning"),this has little effect or relevance.For producing
enterprises, liquidity is offered by stocksof goods, which may be hard toget,
rather than the passivemoney, which is all too easy to obtain.Producers do
face a "soft" budget constraint
(Kornai, 1981). But only if the bankpermits
can passive money financewage payments and thereby "leak" into activemoney,
that which circulates in thehousehold sector.
Here money is active becausewage labour and material incentives have been
maintained in these CPEs. Thus
although the planners set centrally thedemand
for labour and wagerates, there is a labour market on whichworkers are (rela-
tively) free in offering theirservices; and while the supplies ofconsumer
goods and their prices are also fixedcentrally, there is a market on which
households are free to use their
money to purchase from among what is offered.
I have for some time argued that
for the consumer goods market inCPEs
since the mid—19505, there isno clear evidence thatgeneralized, macro—level
excess demand or repressed inflation has
prevailed for long periods (Portes,
1977; Portes and Winter, 1977,1978, 1980). This iscontrary to conventional
wisdom, but many phenomena usuallyattributed to monetary disequilibrium,such
as shortages and the "second
economy" (unofficial, often unrecordedmarkets and
production of various kinds),are in good part due to distortedrelative prices
and deficiencies of the distributive
network. This distinction isimportant—6—
here because monetary controlcannot be used effectively todeal with relative
price problems,* andthe planners' monetary andmacroeconomic policies may still
be adequate although we observe manymicroeconomic disequilibria. Moreover,
to
judge these issues we needmacroeconoIfl analysis and evidence.
Prices are fixed by the plannersfor long periods. They can keepthem that
way while enterprisecosts vary, by altering the turnovertaxes (or subsidies)
set at different rates foreach good, or by altering theirdeductions from (sub-
sidies to) enterprise profits.
Thus a rise in wage costs, say,need not affect
prices at all; just as arise in prices can be met by areduction in turnover
taxes and therefore need not
affect enterprise or household incomesand hence
their expenditure. Moreover, if
there were excess demand for goods,the plan-
ners' direct control over supply meansthat there might be no consequenteffect
on the demand for labour.All this makes macroeconomiccontrol simpler by cut-
ting the links and feedbacksalong which disturbances propagatein the infla-
tionary spirals of marketeconomies. Recent consumer pricerises in Eastern
Europe are not primarilydue to aggregate excess demand (exceptin Poland) or
the effects of world inflation(Portes, 1980), and their repercussionshave been
contained.
Monetary control in CPEs isalso much easier because ofthe structure of
financial institutions and the veryrestricted range of financial assets.There
are no equity shares ordebentures, no stock or bondmarkets; there is little
consumer credit; and tradecredit from a supplier enterprise toits customer is
in principle excluded aswell. Thus the planners need not worryabout the prices
and yields of financial assets(i.e., interest rates) and theireffects on
How much reduction in householdasset and income levels, orrise in the
general price level, would
be necessary to eliminate excessdemand for housing,
automobiles and meat in the East EuropeanCPEs (given current supplies)?How
many other goodswould then be in excess supply?—7—
expenditure, nor aboutopen market operations. There
are no independent commer-
cial banks, so theplanners need not control
their lending behaviourwith reserve
or liquidity ratios orinterest rates; and thereis no such thing asa secondary
expansion of credit generated
by an expansion of themonetary base.
Finally, the domesticmonetary system IScompletelyinsulated from and
unaffected by foreign
sector transactions, whetheron current or capitalaccount.
Transactions withnon—residents are centralizI
in the foreign trade bank(another
branch of themonobank), and there are noproblems of control over theoperations
of international banksand multinationalcorporations.
It should already beevident that a basic
empirical prerequisite formonetar_
ism is met moreclearly in CPEs than in market
economies. The monetary authori-
ties can indeed controland monitor the
money supply quite precisely (seeRud—
cenko, 1978, on how they doso Operationally)That this controlmay not be
fully effective when its
consequences conflict with other
objectives, Policies
and presres doesnot invalidate thispropositjo which emergesclearly from
the comparison ofmonetary institutions outlinedabove.
We can now consider how
monetarist thought mightapply to the macroeconomics
of central planning.We may startconveniently with the generalmonetarist pro-
position for market economies
that money is neutral.One form of this is famil-
iarly expressed by the notionthat "money is a veil":in the long run, atleast,
real variables likeproduction and employment
are independent ofmonetary pheno—
mena.,*Now ina CPE, no macroeconomic full
employment policy isnecessary,
becausefullemployment is assured at the
microeconomic planning level(Ellman,
1979). Detailedmanpow planning, the planners'
(and enterprises') desireto
maximise ontput by using allthe labour which issupplied, and the difficulty
which any enterprise with
some temporarily excessworkers would encount in
*
Andin the short runas well, if expectations
are rational, except forany unsystej monetary shocks("surprises")—8—
trying to sack them, all guaranteethat anyone desiring a job at the going wage
is employed. The objective of monetary policyin CPEs is the control of infla-
tionary pressures.
In a properly functioning market economy, too,macroeconomic policy for full
employment is strictly superfluous, on amonetarist view. Hahn (1980) attributes
to monetarism the belief that the economywill not be very often or very far out
of a "rational expectations equilibrium", which
for our purposes here can be
taken to imply no involuntary unemployment.Thus output stays around the level
givenby full employment of labour (unemploymentat the "natural rate"). In
these circumstances, monetary policy should notseek to affect real variables,
butrather to adjust to them, in a CPE, or toavoid perturbing them from their
long—run paths, in a market economy.In both cases, provided these fundamental
criteria are met, monetary policy has of course a legitimateindependent role
in pursuing the authorities' objectives fornominal variables such as the price
level. With a vertical Phillips curve, macroeconomic policy
should be concerned
with inflation, leaving the reduction of thenatural rate of unemployment to
micro economic measures.
All this is a straightforward coincidence ofviews. Note, however, that
this aspect of monetarism is in the marketeconomies based on the belief that
markets work, that decentralised allocation can ensure
coherence, even eff i—
ciency, but in the CPEs based onthe belief that planning and centralized sig-
nals work, so monetary regulation need not beused to adjust for any mistakes.
Regrettably, perfect administration is as rare asperfect markets.
Closely associated with monetarism inthe public as well as the professional
mind is the quantity equation ,MV=Y=Py.The nominal stock of money out-
standing times the velocity with which itcirculates equals the value of national
income, or the price level timesreal national income. As it stands, this is of—9—
course a tautology, but there are at leasttwo monetarjst interpretationswhich
share the title of the
Quantity Theory of Money. One is thatV is stable, at
least in the medium to long
run, so that changes in N will be theprincipal cau-
ses of changes in Y, subjectperhaps tolong and variable lags. A secondis
the strict version of theneutrality property: if V andy are determined by
real (non—monetary) forces, thenchanges in M will determine changes inthe price
level; again, the causalprocesses through which this impulse istransmitted are
complex, so that lags may be long andvariable. Both versions ignore theprob-
lem of effective demand,
essentially excluding it from the center ofmacroeco—
nomic concerns; and central planners
would certainly go along withthat. But we
can say more.
Milton Friedman once setup a model which, he argued, was Commonto mone—
tarists and Keynesians, butwas missing one equation to make itcomplete, or
determinate. He then maintained thatthe different between monetaristsand
Keynesians was that for the missing
equation, monetarists chose to fixyat its
full—employment (natural rate) level, whileKeynesians chose to fix P at a level
determined exogenously. In aCPE, both are fixed "exogenously",
by the planners.
What does that leave for thequantity equation? With velocityagain taken as
constant, it now gives us the stock ofmoney required to finance transactions.
(Here we are coming close to
Marxist monetary theory's Law ofCirculation,
according to which P, V, andy determine the quantity of money which willbe
drawn into circulation fromhoards.)
The obvious relation, then, betweenthe two cases is that in themarket
economy, the quantity theory becomes atheory of open inflation, while in the
CPE, it is a theory of repressed
inflation; or alternatively, in both,a guide
to non—inflationary monetarypolicy. Either as theory or policy, thecausal
mechanism is likely to be quicker andmore reliable in the CPE——orvelocity—10—
more stable——given the much simpler institutionaland asset structures.*
A strong similarity in analytical method emerges fromthe observation that
monetarists center attention on stocks of assets more than onflows of expendi-
tures or receipts. Central planners, too, emphasizein their analyses the stocks
of currency and savings deposits held by the public, as well asinventories held
by distributive trade enterprises, and ratiosof these stocks to retail trade
turnover, rather than any marginal propensities.
It has often been regarded as a basic tenet of monetarismthat the stock
demand for money function is more stable than the Keynesianflow consumption
expenditure function. In a CPE, if we take household moneyto include both
currency and savings deposits, then theabsence of other financial assets and
debts means that the two functions are virtually equivalent: Savingsequals
the increment to money stocks.
It might nevertheless be argued that in a CPE the demandfor money is more
fundamental, or more stable, for at least two reasons: The rateof interest
paid on savings deposits does not vary in the short run;and prices are quite
stable, so price expectations are not volatile. Nor are quantityexpectations,
either of employment or of aggregate consumption goods supplies.Thus although
the planners are concerned about temonetary overhang" andthe possibility that
in some crisis households may suddenly and massively seek toconvert their money
savings into goods, in fact this does not appear to happen.**Their concern may
perhaps be traced to another residual influenceof Marxist monetary theory,
• .A planner in an almost totallycontrolled economy.. .should find the
quantity theory more useful than the Keynesiantheory"(Mayer, 1978, pp. 40—41).
**
Eventhe breakdown of the consumer goods market in Poland in1981 was due
mainly to wage increases exceeding 20% (withfixed consumer prices) and cuts in
supplies, rather than massive dishoarding.—11--
Marx's emphasis on and his view thatpaper money will not be hoarded,
so that amounts of
paper money Outstanding inexcess of the needs of circulation
cause paper money to depreciate
relative to gold (commodities)
Both central planners
and monetarists, ofcourse, tend to attribute special
significance to one type of
asset: money. This isperhaps more understandable
for the planners, sincemoney is the only financial
asset in CPEs. But its dis-
tribution between
currency, demand deposits and timedeposits would appear impor-
tant, because onlycurrency can be used forpayment in the shops and between
households (in particular,in the "second
economy"), while time depositsare
often tied to accumulation
of the purchase price ofspecific durable goods.
In fact, it is notablethat in those CPEs forwhich we have data, theratios
of currency to totalhousehold money have followed
remarkably stable, secular
trends downwards since the
mid—1950s,* Nevertheless,households have since the
l960s been able topurchase substantialquantities of durable goods,and it is
surprising that the plannersseem to be uninterested in
household portfolio allo-
cation between money anddurables.
The stress onmoney by market economy monetarists
and their attempt to draw
somewhere a sharp line betweenit and other householdassets is even lesscompre-
hensible, insofar as theirview of the mechanism
transmitting impulses from
money rests on substitutability
across a wide range of financialand real assets.
But monetarists do oftenact as if there were
only one condition for stock
equilibrium, that of equality between
the demand for andsupply of money.
Despite the mutual analytical
and policy emphasison stocks, there is a
major difference in styles of
economic policy andmonetary control. Whereas
See Rudcenko (1979) for
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungaryand Poland. For the U.S.S.R., Peebles(1981) shows the samepicture, except for atemporary upwards jump in the mid—1960s.—12—
market economy monetarists keepstocks at the forefront by makingtheir policy
targets the level of monetary aggregates,the central planners' actual monetary
control is exercised on the flow of income.
This observation reveals a commonmisconception about monetary planningand
control in CPEs. It is often said thatalthough the main function of monetary
planning in CPEs is to maintainmacroeconomic equilibrium (in thehousehold sec-
tor), this is 4pemented withcontrols which operate at theinicroeconOiflic level.
These controls are applied directly bythe bank, regulating credit toeach
enterprise on the basis of its plan.
In this view, the planning processstarts with aggregate macroeconomic quan-
tities (plans for real macrovariables), which are then "brokendown" (disaggrega—
ted) through the planning hierarchydown to the enterprise level. The resulting
microeconomic quantities, targets for inputs
and outputs for each enterprise,
then imply microecOfloifliC financial plans,which are summed to give the macroeco-
nomic or aggregate monetary plan.There is in this scheme no aggregate—level
control over monetary variables, not even
a direct control over total currency
emission.
If this were so, monetary policy in
CPEs would be much less effectivethan
it actually is. In implementation,
the micro—level control over eachenterprise's
credit is unrelated to the aggregate monetary
targets, and it would alwaysbe
frustrated by the priority of productiongoals, the impossibility of suppressing
trade credit (Podoiski, 1972), etc.
But the story so far omits acentral charac-
ter, incomes polçy, whichin CPEs plays a leading role oppositemonetary policy
and in harmony with it.
The primary tool of monetarycontrol is the planning and prescribingof wage
rates and wage fund targets.These too are "broken down" to enterprisesfrom
initial aggregates, just like output plans,and the aggregate wage and output—13—
targets are intended to beConsistent in both productionand consumptionThat
is, the wage rates setare intended to draw
a labour supply equal tothe planned
demand for labour; thewage fund plan Correspondsto the total remunerationat
those rates, of theplanned volume ofemployment; the productionplan is related
to an aggregatetarget for consumption
goods supply; and at thegiven consumer
prices, the aggregate valueof this supply isplanned to equal the demandwhich
households willexpress, given their initialassets and the plannedwage pay-
ments.
This then gives a muchmore direct relation between
wages and the money sup-
ply than in any view ofa market economy,monetarist or non—monetarist__but
explicitly the other
way round: wages determine the
supply of money to the
household sector. Thisrelation is the key to
the monetary economicsof CPEs.
The cash plan derivesfrom wages, theessential elements of thecredit plan
derive from the cashplan, and at the center of
monetary control is the balance
of honey incomes andexpenditures of the population.
Thus the actual controlis
o'v'er the flow of incomesrather than theaggregate stock of householdmoney.
*
Theformer is the instrument
the latter is the
proximate target, with the
ultimate targets beingconsujption demand and labour
supply.
Here the planners
part company with monetarismon an essential point: in
market economy
monetarism, there appears to beno long—run role whatsoeverfor
incomes policy, becausein the long runwages have no independent effecton
prices or real output, andin the short runcontrols are aimed directlyat the
monetary aggregates. In the
CPEs, monetary policy reducesto incomes policy
(which in fact is fiscal
Policy as well, parallelto our income andpayroll
taxes——see below).
*
Notethat if they abjure
changing the general pricelevel, the planners have only a derivative
control (flow) to regulatea stock.—14—
This story of monetary control inCPEs has dealt with the intentionand
the process, rather than the outcome.The control over wages, and thus over
the money supply, can break down.Whereas in a market economy, divergencefront
monetary targets may originate
in either the public or the private sector,in
the CPE there is only one fundamental source:
the relation between the state
enterprises and their branches ofthe monobank. The priority of output among
the objectives of planners, enterprise managers
and Party secretaries means
that the bank will often have toconcede finance for above—plan payments,either
directly or by extending generalcredit to enterprises whose costsexceed plans
and which consequently find themselveswith liquidity problems (Kornai's"soft"
budget constraint). Bank managersare understandably reluctant tobankrupt
state enterprises, and this wouldin any case probably be useless. Soviola-
tors of cost targets are"financed when they overshoot (Wiles, 1977, p.372)".
Even Stalin never used the monetarycontrol technique of shooting the bankers
when they overfinance, which doubtlesswould have been quite effective.
This weakness of monetary control inCPEs has its aggregate—level parallel
in market economies. Here, anaccommodating monetary policy has inthe past
permitted firms to pass on wageincreases in price increases. Wherethis ver-
sion of the soft budget constrainthas not sufficed, often the statehas
directly intervened financially (e.g.,Lockheed and Chrysler in theU.S.).
Policy recently changed underthe Conservative government in theU.K. But as
in CPEs, the authorities still do notlet public sector enterprises gobank-
rupt, whatever level of wageincreases they grant. And itremains an open
question whether the key weaknessof applied monetarism will prove tobe a
reluctance to permit major, extensive private
sector bankruptcies and conse-
quent mass unemployment.Whatever the likelihood that thiswill lead to a—15—
policy "U—turn", it isgreater than it would be if, like theCPE, there were an
incomes policySupporting monetary control.
From a fundamental issuewe now turn to a minor but
interesting analogy.
It was once regarded
as a principal tenet ofmonetarism that the demand for
money IS relatively insensitive to therate of interest. Though thisis now a
less important part of the
monetarist story, we should notethat it is easily
applicable to CPEs. Here the
monetary control mechanism hasnever given any
role to the interest rate.
Although household saving orportfolio allocation
behaviour might wellvary with the interest rate, this isimpossible to estab-
lish empirically, becausethe planners have alteredthe interest rate so sel-
dom (and then in discrete
steps, and Practically alwaysupwards) since the mid—
1950s. They do not use theinterest rate as amacroeconomic control variable,
either in relation tohouseholds, or to affect
aggregate enterprise investment
demand, or aggregate inventoryholdings. And the interestrate does not vary
without an explicit planners'decision: it is not a flexibleprice in any mar-
ket. Clearly, therefore,the central planners wouldfollow marketeconomy
monetarists in regarding theprice of money as the inverse ofthe price level
of goods, rather thanas the interest rate.
So far, I have ignoredforeign trade and payments. But
all existing CPEs
except the U.S.S.R. are now
relatively open economies, andeven Soviet parti-
cipation in foreign trade isnot negligible. The standardCPE isolates the
domestic monetary system andprice level from the foreignsector and foreign
prices*; to do this, ituses the "price_equa1isat0
subsidy (tax)". At the
macroeconomic level, this is theequivalent of a continuously
floating exchange
rate, the means by which monetaristsseek to preserve theautonomy of domestic
—----------------------
SeeWolf (1980) for details.This does not mean that domestic
monetary policy cannot affect the foreign
sector——see Portes (1979b).—16—
monetary policy and its effects onthe domestic price level. Conversely, afloat-
ing exchange rate eliminates the disciplineexerted on domestic policy and infla-
tion rates by the balance of payments constraint,
it appears that for this disci-
pline we must substitute either central planningor a suitably austere and
restrictive monetary policy.
The alternative framework is that provided byfixed exchange rates and a
gold or gold—exchange standard. Thisoffers an external, autonomous form of con-
trol over the domestic money supply andmacroeconomic policy (though some mone-
tarists would now agree that even in themedium run, a considerable degree of
sterilization of the effects of reserve flows onthe domestic money supply is
feasible——see Darby, 1980). The CPEs do have adoctrinal attachment to gold,
both because of its importance in Marxist monetarytheory, and more practically
because the U.S.S.R. is the world's second—largestgold producer. But neither a
foreigner nor a resident of any CPEcould redeem rubles or zlotys or lei, how-
ever earned, for gold, at either theofficial or the market rate. Nor could a
holder of the domestic currency buy dollars orsterling, except possibly in very
limited quantities for authorized tourism.
This is not to say that convertible currencies arevalueless in the CPEs——
quite the contrary, as Mr. Honeckeris said to have confirmed on his trip to
West Germany, which he found really justlike the East: he could buy anything
there for Westmarks. Nevertheless, to go to afixed exchange rate system, with
consequent direct relations betweendomestic and foreign prices and money sup-
plies, would be totally incompatiblewith central planning. Despite their
acknowledgements to David Hume, in practice mostmonetarists have also favoured
floating rates.
Central to the debate between monetaristsand non—monetarists in the 1970s
was the issue of "crowding out",which supplanted earlier arguments over the—17—
relative size and stability ofthe effects on nominal income
of monetary injec-
tions and changes inautonomous expenditures. Monetaristsassert that govern-
ment expenditure ultimately "crowdsout" (displaces or substitutesfor) an
equivalent volume of private
expenditure, through some combinationof interest
rate and price level changes.The consequence is thatat least in the longrun,
fiscal policy cannot affectoutput.
In the centrally plannedeconomy, with full employment andcentral physical
allocation of resources, it isevident that an increase inthe state sector's
use of output (say for investment
or military expenditure) mustentail an equiva-
lent reduction in the householdsector's use (consumption)
The only exception
could be when the planners
adjust net exports, butalthough there is some evi-
dence they do this in the short
run, it is not likely to be a feasibleshift of
the long run equilibrjum•
Indeed, with prices fixed we have inthe CPE a sort of "super
crowding out",
due to repressed inflation.
Starting in full employmentequilibrj with no
excess demand and holding
wages constant, a shift in outputaway from consump-
tion causes excess demand for
consumer goods, which discourageslabour supply.
As workers find theycannot spend as much as they would
like, they will react
at least partly by workingless. The result will bea fall in output, hence in
the amount available for
consumption, hence perhaps a further fallin labour
supply, until this "supply multiplier"
process comes to rest (Barro and Gross—
man, 1974; Portes, 1981).
If however excess demandmeans that some individualsare now unable to pur-
chase particular goodsor services which they find
sufficiently important, they
may offer (instead of money) goodsor services at their disposalwhich are also
in short supply. Thus Imay offer to fix your car if
you paint my flat, because
neither of us can find theseservices we want offered formoney. If this—18—
opportunity to barter resultsin additioi labour supply (notmerely an equal
reduction of hours worked for money), wehave a paradoxical result: the use-
lessness of money hoards meansthat some unsatisfied demandswill create or
evoke their own corresponding supplies.
This is an unfamiliar side of Say's Law,
which holds that ifthereis no hoarding, supply will createits owndemand(in
the sense that any offer of goods orservices must constitute a demandfor their
equivalent in exchange). If barterwere organised properly,and with no trans-
actions costs or uncertainty, therecould be no aggregate excessdemand.
Paradoxical effects of excess demandextend to CPE foreign trade policy.
The macroeconomic problems of CPE5 aretypically those of excessreal demand,
ifnotnecessarily in the household sector,certainly in the state productive
sector——"overfullemployment planning". Themacroeconomic problems of market
economiesare typically, though not always,excess supply and unemployment.In
a market economy, one way to
combat unemployment is to export it,by running an
export surplus. This
"beggar_ThY_fleighb0" policy has its CPEcounterpart,
which is to export excess demand byrunning an import surplus.When the coun-
tries of Comecon seek to do this amongeach other, it is indeed a "beggar—my—
neighbour" policy. When marketeconomies and CPE5 are in symmetricalcircum-
stances and trade with each other,however, each will be willing tosatisfy the
other's policy objectives, provided
there is some way of financingthe cen-
trally planned economies' deficits
with the market economies. Thisis precisely
what has been happening sincethe early 1970s (Fortes, 1980).
Neither of these paradoxes is strictly
relevant to the relations between
central planning and monetarism,
but the second does lead directlyto an impor-
tantparallel. It has been suggested(Purvis, 1980) that the"acid test" for a
monetarist is the policy recommendation
following an increase in theoil price—19--
for a major oil importer.The monetarist wouldargue that this will require a
reduction in real income andthe real value of
money holdings, so that the nomi-
nal stock of money should
certainly not be increased; whilea non—monetarist
would argue that the oilprice rise will have the
deflationary effect of an
indirect tax increase,
so that monetary policy shouldbe expansionary. On this
test, the macroeconomics of
central planning must bemonetarist: the tax
effect does not operate and
full employment is notthreatened (except insofar
as the real income loss
may induce bottlenecks in
Production); the only alter-
native to reducing real incomesand demand is to runan import surplus,export-
ing the excess demand created
by the deterioration of theterms of trade.
Let us return to the rolesof fiscal andmonetary Policies in a closed
economy. The monetarist wouldsay, in view of the relation between
money stock
and nominal income, thestability of the demand formoney relative to consump-
tion behaviour, andtcrowding out", that fiscalpolicy has no independent status
and should adjust tomonetary targets. In fact, fiscal
policy is implied by
these targets and by the
government budget constraint,given a stable private
sector demand for money. Thus
the nionetarist experimentin the U.K. has stressed
the (empirically weak)relationship between the
government deficit, its borrowing
requirement, and the monetaryaggregates.
In the CPE, with nosecondary credit expansion andno Possibility for the
private sector to create
money, fiscal policy is equivalent
to monetary policy.
The relation isstrong and direct. The planners
always plan and normally achieve
a balanced budget or slight
surplus. A surplus would bedeflationary, but it is
more straightforw to place
the responsibility forany inflationary pressures
directly on the bank, where itbelongs (since an excessiveincrease in themoney
supply to households can be identified
with an excessive increasein credits to
enterprises, net of their deposits withthe bank).—20—
Monetarism has long been associated with the caseagainst "fine—tuning" the
economy, using an activist ordiscretionary monetary policy.Friedman's
early arguments rested on theauthorities' lack of knowledge about the mechanism
of transmission of monetary effects, the lags, etc.,so that the private sector
would be more stable if monetary policy were simplyto follow a fixed rule. A
more recent justification of a similarconclusion is the argument from the sup-
posed rationality of private sector expectations:that agents use information
efficiently in making their forecasts aboutthe economy and taking decisions
based on them, and that such information mustinclude' knowledge of any systema-
tic policy pursued by the authorities.If so, it is argued, the path of real
output is affected only by changesin the money supply which agents cannotanti-
cipate, and so cannot be part of a systematicpolicy.
For the CPE, we have already seen thatthe planners do not want or need an
active monetary policy, in the sense of onewhich seeks to influence output or
employment. Hence the rule thatthe state budget should balance, so that any
change in household cash will be themirror image of a change in enterprises'
aggregate net liabilities tothe monobank. This in turn should be consistent
with the material balances and wage plans.
The planners know, of course, that therewill be some overshooting (and
hence bank overfinancing of enterprises),and that they must compensate by some
conscious underplanning of wages. The hypothesisthat expectations are formed
rationally is perhaps more plausible inthe CPE than in the market economy,
because the planners' policy rules arebetter defined, better known to agents;
and their policies change less often.
Thus, a wide range of considerations suggestthat monetarism as theory and
policy might work better in CPE circumstances,with soviet—style financial—21—
Institutions, than it does in
our developed marketeconomies. Our monetarysys- tem is excessively
intricate, and this makes
monetarist regularjti8 lessregular
than they might be.These complexitiesappear to come at a high costwith rela-
tively little benefit.
Certainly bankers,Particularly central bankers, could
easily adjust to the changed
circumstances. Indeed, thetwo major classes of
economic agents whose behaviour
seems system_invariantare central bankers and
peasants. Soviet bankers
would be quite at homeat meetings of the BIS inBasle, and Polish bankers
identified more with theOutlook of the Western bankerswith
whom they dealt thanthat of their own
economic planning, ministryand Party
officials
Successful monetaryPlanning and control in a CPErequires a thoroughgoing,
serious incomes policy,coordinated with the
monetary targets. It is in this
light ironic that if thecurrent British experiment
(1979—81) should fail, the
country might react by goingmuch further towards
central planning thanever
before. Should this
occur, it might well involvea new structure for thebank-
ing system; and it is difficult
to imagine such a set ofpolicies without a
serious policy forincomes, whatever the political
Opposition. But eithercon-
sistent monetarism orconsistent central Planningis so painful a disciplinethat
it may require adegree of political
control impossible to realisein a Pluralis-
tic Society.
The dictionary definitionof ttfellow_travellervvis one who Supportsor sym—
pathises with theprograimne of an organised
group without actually joiningit;
especially a supporter of the
Communist Party. Thus thereis an asymmetry, and
clearly room for a final
paradox: my title leftopen the question of who follows
whom. Perhaps thedictionary definition
suggests the wrong leader. Professor
Friedman might be alarmedif he looked over hisleft shoulder.—22—
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